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MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE CONSPIRACIES:
THE EFFECT OF STROMBERG V. CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
American prosecutors have frequently relied on the well-
established law of conspiracy' to punish incipient criminal activity.'
1. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more people to
achieve an unlawful objective or a lawful objective by unlawful means. Common-
wealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 123 (1842); Developments in the Law-
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 922 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Developments]. The defendant is charged with agreeing to achieve at least one objec-
tive, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), and performing an overt act in furtherance of that
objective. Developments, supra, at 945-49; see Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370,
378 & n.12 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 293, 301-02 & n.1 (1957); United
States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 84 (1915); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
367 (1912); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S- 959 (1976); United States v. Goodwin, 455 F.2d 710, 714
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972); United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d
894, 896 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972); Horwitz v. United States,
5 F.2d 129, 130-31 (1st Cir. 1925). Unlike most offenses in which the commission of
an act is the crime, conspiracy is an inchoate offense. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Hand-
book on Criminal Law § 61, at 459 (1972); Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Con-
spiracy, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1137, 1157-64 (1973); Lecture by Hon. Grover Moscowitz,
before the Section on Federal Practice of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (Mar. 14, 1944), reprinted in 3 F.R.D. 380, 392 (1944). The activity pro-
scribed is the agreement among the co-conspirators. Developments, supra, at 926;
see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810-11 (1946); Pinkerton
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1946); United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S.
205, 210 (1940); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1915); United
States v. Murray, 527 F.2d 401, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1976); Cousens, Agreement as an
Element in Conspiracy. 23 Va. L. Rev. 898 (1937). Thus, conspiracy is considered to
be a crime, separate from the substantive offense. See Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946); United States v. Vastine, 363 F.2d 853, 854 (3d Cir. 1966);
Allen v. United States, 89 F.2d 954, 955-56 (4th Cir. 1937). Conspiracy is usually
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), the general conspiracy statute. Several other
federal statutes have their own conspiracy provisions. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2303 (1976)
(engage in unfair trade practices affecting producers of agricultural products); 10
U.S.C. § 881 (1976) (commit offenses against the Uniform Code of Military Justice);
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976) (restrain or monopolize trade); 16 U.S.C. § 831t (1976) (de-
fraud TVA); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) (injure or oppress citizens in enjoyment of their
civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1976) (file false claims against the United States); 18
U.S.C. § 351 (1976) (assassinate or kidnap members of Congress); 18 U.S.C. § 372
(1976) (injure or impede any government official in the discharge of his duties); 18
U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976) (commit espionage); 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1976) (collect exten-
sions of credit by extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 956 (1976) (injure property of a foreign
government); 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976) (kidnap); 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976) (obstruct
enforcement of state or local gambling laws); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1976) (kill or kidnap
of the President or Vice President of the United States); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2153-2155
(1976) (sabotage war materials or produce defective war materials); 18 U.S.C. § 2192
(1976) (incite seamen to mutiny); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2384-2385 (1976) (advocate the over-
throw of the government). Conspiracy requires proof of elements different from the
substantive crime. Developments, supra, at 925-53.
2. In addition to punishing group criminality, conspiracy reaches preparatory
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The issues in conspiracy trials and appeals, however, can be
amorphous3 and complicated.' Although conspiracy is usually related
to commission of a substantive crime,' the extent to which a convic-
tion of conspiracy depends on a conviction of the underlying crime is
conduct at an earlier point than attempt. Model Penal Code § 5.03, Comment, at
96-97 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at 459;
Developments, supra note 1, at 922.
3. 1 National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers
381 (1970) (Report of L. Schwartz and G. Blakey on Conspiracy and Organized
Crime).
4. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1139-40 (conspiracy is confusing and complex);
Zumwalt, The Conspiracy Confusion, Trial, Jul./Aug. 1974, at 26, 26-27 (same); De-
velopments, supra note 1, at 925-56 (discussing the elements of conspiracy).
5. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 587-88 (1961); Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 (1946); United States v. Head, Nos. 79-5293, 79-5303,
80-6727, slip op. at 4-5 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1981); United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d
239, 240-41 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Wilkinson, 601 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1031 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d
32, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Dansker, 537
F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v.
Papadalds, 510 F.2d 287, 289-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United
States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 569 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975); United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Goodwin, 455 F.2d 710, 711, 714 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972);
United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 895 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
920 (1972); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 955 (1971); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 974 (1966); see W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, § 62, at 494; 8 J.
Moore, Federal Practice 8.06[2], at 8-32 to 8-37 (2d ed. 1980); Johnson, supra note
1, at 1143; Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 2
(1957). See generally Developments, supra note 1. Charging conspiracy in addition to
the substantive crime provides the government with another chance to convict defen-
dants. "[C]onspiracy is useful to supplement the generally restrictive law of
attempts," Johnson, supra note 1, at 1137, and "to make it easier to impose criminal
punishment on members of groups that plot forbidden activity." Id. at 1139. Con-
spiracy law also provides that co-conspirators are liable for every reasonably foresee-
able crime committed by members of the group. See Model Penal Code § 5.03,
Comment, at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1146-50;
Klein, supra, at 8-9. A conspiracy charge also gives the prosecution an important
evidentiary advantage in that proof of almost any overt act will satisfy the conspiracy
statute. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957); Braverman v. United
States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); United States v. Barrera, 547 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir. 1976); Smith v.
United States, 92 F.2d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1937); Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d
594, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925); Model Penal Code § 5.03(5),
Comment, at 140 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35
Geo. L.J. 328, 338 (1947); Developments, supra note 1, at 945-46; Note, The Con-
spiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defend-
ants, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 278-80 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Conspiracy Dilemma].
The only requirement is that the overt act must be separate from the formation of
the agreement. Developments, supra note 1, at 946 & n. 172. Prosecutors also gain
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unclear. 6 When the substantive crime with which a defendant is
charged is alleged as the objective of the conspiracy, some elements
of conspiracy are identical to the elements of' the substantive crime.
The mens rea of the conspiracy and the substantive crime, for exam-
ple, are nearly indistinguishable.7 Yet, conspiracy requires proof that
the defendants intended to agree and to commit the substantive
crime.8 Moreover, a substantive crime can be alleged as an objective
or as an overt act 9 in furtherance of the conspiracy. As the objective
of the conspiracy, the crime need not be accomplished. The overt
act, however, must be performed."° Because courts have failed to
make this distinction, they have confused the role of the substantive
crime in the conspiracy conviction."
The effect of this confusion is readily apparent when a conspiracy
conviction is appealed. Under the federal conspiracy statute, 2 defen-
numerous procedural advantages by charging conspiracy. Members of a conspiracy
can be joined for trial; venue is proper in any jurisdiction in which an overt act was
committed as well as the jurisdiction in which the agreement was made; the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the conspiracy is abandoned or successfully
accomplished; and out-of-court statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy are
not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, § 61,
at 455-59; Johnson, supra note 1, at 1166-68; Klein, supra note 5, at 9-10; Conspra.
cy Dilemma, supra note 5, at 282-83. Much authority, however, states that conspira-
cy prosecutions overly prejudice defendants. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 Buffalo
L. Rev. 242, 263-68 (1954); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1139, 1144; Klein, supra note
5, at 4; Conspiracy Dilemma, supra note 5, at 277-84.
6. At common law, conspiracy merged with the completed substantive offense
so that defendants could be convicted of either the completed crime or conspiracy,
but not both. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589 (1961); W. LaFave & A.
Scott, supra note 1, § 63, at 494; Johnson, supra note 1, at 1150. The modern rule,
followed in both the federal system, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,
589-90 (1961); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946), and in the vast
majority of the states, 66 Va. L. Rev. 241, 248 & n.57 (1980), is that conspiracy is a
crime separate from the substantive offense, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640, 643 (1946), and the defendant can receive consecutive sentences for both
offenses if the legislature evinces such an intent. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S.
587, 597 (1961).
7. Developments, supra note 1, at 935. Conspiracy has been criticized as a
crime consisting of intent only. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, § 61, at 460;
Developments, supra note 1, at 925 & n.29.
8. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, § 61, at 464-65; Harno, Intent in
Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624 (1941); Zumwalt, supra note 4, at 27;
Developments, supra note 1, at 935-37.
9. E.g., Indictment at 3, 6, 7, United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.
1980); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Goodwin, 455 F.2d 710, 714 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972); cf.
United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 897 n.3 (1st Cir. 1971) (attempt to smuggle
aliens could have been a sufficient overt act), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972).
10. See note 1 supra.
11. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, § 62, at 477; see United States v.
Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 474 (3d Cir. 1977).
12. The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), prohibits agreements
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dants are frequently convicted of more than one substantive crime
and of conspiracy to commit those crimes. 3 The circuits are divided
on whether the conspiracy conviction should stand if one of the sub-
stantive counts is overturned on appeal." The First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits reverse the conspiracy conviction,'" holding
that the jury may have convicted defendants on an invalid basis.16
The Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, uphold
the conspiracy conviction if it could have been based on any of the
"to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States
... in any manner or for any purpose." United States criminal law does not punish a
group of individuals unless it is clear that they intended to do something contrary to
law. See note 1 supra. The objective of defrauding the United States has been held
to include not only fraud, United States v. Woll, 157 F. Supp. 704, 708-09 (E D. Pa.
1957), but also impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any gov-
ernmental department, Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910); accord, Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172
(1966); United States v. Woll, 157 F. Supp. 704, 709 (E.D. Pa. 1957), by deceit,
craft or trickery, or at least by dishonest means. Hammerschmidt v. United States,
265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971). Because this portion of the statute encompasses
agreements in which the conduct is not chargeable under a separate statute, see
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 Yale L.J. 405, 41444 (1959),
it is beyond the scope of this Note. This analysis will be limited to cases brought
under the first part of the statute.
13. E.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1919); Rowan v.
United States, 281 F. 137, 139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922); Ander-
son v. United States, 269 F. 65, 76 (9th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 576
(1921).
14. Compare Petition for Certiorari at 13-18, Wedelstedt v. United States, 442
U.S. 916 (1979) (certiorari denied) with Brief for the United States in Opposition at
5-8, Wedelstedt v. United States, 442 U.S. 916 (1979) (certiorari denied).
15. United States v. Head, Nos. 79-5293, 79-5303, 80-6727, slip op. at 8-12 (4th
Cir. Feb. 9, 1981); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669-70 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 566-6S
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475-77 (3d Cir. 1977). United States v.
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United
States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 898 (Ist Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920
(1972); Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1963).
16. "[I]t is not an offense to conspire to do an act that, if completed, would not
be a crime." United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1323 (5th Cir. 1979) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980); accord, Pettibone v. United States, 148
U.S. 197, 203 (1893); United States v. Fine, 413 F. Supp. 728, 730-32 (W.D. Wis.
1976). The term "failure to state a crime" encompasses three general categories. A
count may fail to state a crime because the statute under which it is charged has
been held unconstitutional, e.g., United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 566.70
(7th Cir. 1973), or if the statute has been interpreted unconstitutionally. United
States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 48-49 (3d Cir. 1976). cert. denied. 429 U.S. 103S
(1977). A count may also fail to state a crime when the jury is incorrectly instructed.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303-10 (1957); Samuel v. United States, 169
F.2d 787, 792-95, 797 (9th Cir. 1948). Moreover, a count fails to state a crime if it
does not clearly set forth the nature and elements of the offense. See United States
v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 473-74 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Adcock. 447 F.2d
1981]
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remaining valid criminal objectives.17 Moreover, the decisions of the
Seventh Circuit appear to be in conflict on the question."
This Note examines conspiracy convictions that are challenged be-
cause one of the underlying substantive counts has been reversed.
Part I discusses the general rule governing convictions based on more
than one ground, as stated in Stromberg v. California 11 and its prog-
eny. Part II analyzes cases that follow Stromberg, those that do not
1337, 1338 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Van Liew v.
United States, 321 F.2d 664, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Balistrieri, 346
F. Supp. 341, 347-49 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The indictment must clearly set forth the
nature and elements of the offense charged, Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1), so that the
defendant can prepare his defense and plead double jeopardy in case of a subsequent
prosecution. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962); 8 J. Moore, supra
note 5, 7.04, at 7-16. A count may also fail to state a crime if it does not state a
federal offense. United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980); O'Kelley v. United States, 116 F.2d 966, 968 (8th
Cir. 1941). But see Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971). Substantive convictions obtained in these circumstances
are routinely overturned on appeal. United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F,2d 339, 341
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d
128, 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). The federal conspiracy statute
prohibits "conspir[ing] . . . to commit any offense against the United States." 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Federal courts cannot prosecute a conspiracy to achieve an
objective that is not an offense against the United States. United States v. Birchfield,
486 F. Supp. 137, 13940 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). In United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d
1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979), some of the objectives alleged in
the conspiracy count were not federal offenses. The court, however, upheld the con-
spiracy conviction, but with the qualification that the jury must be instructed to find
an agreement to commit at least one of the federal offenses. Id. at 1178-79; accord,
United States v. Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir. 1970). Courts sometimes
overturn conspiracy convictions when the substantive crime has been reversed for
lack of evidence. United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 666, 669 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). Acquittal on a substantive charge does not require
acquittal on the conspiracy charge because the evidence for each crime is different.
In United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1977), however, the court over-
turned the conspiracy conviction because the government did not introduce evidence
to show the requisite intent to defraud the United States. Id. at 474-75. Both intent
to commit the crime and intent to agree to do so are required for a conspiracy
conviction. Developments, supra note 1, at 935.
17. E.g., United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966); Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875, 878
(6th Cir. 1943); United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940).
18. Compare United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 189-91 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1047 11974) and United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 139-40 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) with United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d
556, 559-62 (7th Cir. 1973).
19. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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apply its rule, and the problems caused by each approach. Finally,
this Note provides a test to determine whether to reverse or uphold
conspiracy convictions when one of the underlying substantive counts
is reversed.
I. CONVICTIONS BASED ON MORE THAN ONE GROUND
The basic tenet of criminal justice is that a defendant will be
punished only for committing an unlawful act.2' Correlatively, when
a conviction is based on any one of several grounds, each ground
must constitute an unlawful activity. 2' In Stromberg v. California,=
the Supreme Court ruled that considerations of fairness require a re-
versal of a general verdict of guilty when any of the bases of the
verdict is constitutionally invalid.? Stromberg involved a state stat-
ute that prohibited the display of a red flag for any of three
purposes.24 The Court found that one of the prohibitions was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad zs and, therefore, did not "constitute a lawful
foundation for a criminal prosecution." '  Because it was impossible
to determine from the trial record that the defendant had not been
20. 1 B. Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (pt.
III), § 373, at 87 (1968). "The substantive criminal law is that law which, for the
purpose of preventing harm to society, (a) declares what conduct is criminal, and (b)
prescribes the punishment to be imposed for such conduct. It includes the definition
of specific offenses and general principles of liability .... Thus the definition of a
particular crime will spell out what act (or omission) and what mental state is re-
quired for its commission .... [C]onduct cannot be called 'criminal' unless a
punishment is prescribed therefor." W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, § 2, at 5-6
(footnote omitted); accord, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 125 (1967).
21. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 588-89 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949); Cramer v.
United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 n.45 (1945); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29,
540-41 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); United States v.
Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-25, 328 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976);
United States v. Adcock, 447 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971); United States v. Robbins, 354 F.2d 741, 74243 (2d Cir. 1965);
Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622, 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919
(1962).
22. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
23. Id. at 368.
24. Id. at 361. The parties stipulated to the facts and the Court summarized
them briefly. Appellant was a member of the Young Communist League. She worked
as a supervisor in a children's summer camp, teaching history and economics. The
charge against her concerned a daily ritual at which the children saluted a red flag
under her direction. Id. at 362-63.
25. Id. at 368-70.
26. Id. at 368.
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found guilty under the invalidated clause alone,' the conviction was
reversed. 2
Although the conclusion in Stromberg was drawn "from the man-
ner in which the case was sent to the jury," 29 the rule has been
applied more broadly in subsequent cases."I In Thomas v. Collinsl
and Street v. New York, 32 the Court overturned convictions because it
found that the valid bases and the invalid bases were inextricably
entwined." The Court concluded in both instances that "[tjhe judg-
27. The Court was convinced that "it cannot be determined upon this record that
the appellant was not convicted under [the invalid] clause." Id. at 368. The jury was
instructed that the defendant need only have violated one clause of the statute; in
fact, the state's attorney argued that the jury could convict based on a violation of the
invalid clause alone. Id. "[T]he necessary conclusion from the manner in which the
case was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the
Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld." Id.
28. Id. In a separate opinion in People v. Mintz, 62 Cal. App. 788, 290 P. 93
(1930), rev'd sub nom. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), Judge Marks
expressed the belief that the first clause of the statute was of doubtful constitutional-
ity because it could be construed to outlaw peaceful opposition to the political party
in power. Id. at 794, 797, 290 P. at 97, 99 (Marks, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Because the clause could be removed from the section without materially
changing its purposes, however, the court considered the statute to be constitutional,
id. at 797, 290 P. at 99 (Marks, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and upheld
the conviction under the remaining valid clauses. Id. at 792, 290 P. at 96. Strom-
berg's principle has been consistently reaffirmed. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
31-32 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1969); Terminiello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 n.45 (1945);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29, 540-41 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-25, 328 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v. Adcock, 447 F.2d
1337, 1339 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); United States v.
Robbins, 354 F.2d 741, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1965); Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622,
631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962).
29. 283 U.S. at 368.
30. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 529 (1945).
31. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
32. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
33. Id. at 588; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1945). The analysis of
the relationship between valid and invalid charges in Thomas and Street suggests
that the Court was concerned that the evidence relating to the invalid count unduly
influenced the jury to find defendants guilty. Courts are also concerned that invalid
counts might cause the jury to find defendants guilty on the conspiracy count. See
United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 24447 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 343 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916
(1979); United States %-. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 387 n.14 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950
(1975); Samuel v. United States, 169 F.2d 787, 798 (9th Cir. 1948). The possibility
that the invalid charge prejudices the defendants is difficult to disprove. Fed. R.
Evid. 606(b) provides that a juror may not testify as to anything that influenced his,
or any other juror's, deliberations, except that he may testify as to extraneous in-
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ment... must be affirmed as to both or as to neither.'" Tius inter-
pretation of Stromberg has been used to overturn convictions
whenever they might have been based on both valid and invalid
grounds.35
Although Stromberg did not involve a conspiracy, its rule has been
applied to conspiracy cases.36 When parties agree to achieve an
objective that is not punishable under federal law, it is impossible'
formation improperly brought to the jury's attention. Courts, therefore, do not
attempt to evaluate the effect that possibly prejudicial counts or evidence may have
had on the jury's deliberations. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 5S8
(1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1945); United States v. Papadakis,
510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v.
Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); cf. United
States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir.) (evidence improperly admitted against
defendant as to all frauds was prejudicial because no foundation was laid that it was
relevant to more than one), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670 (1941). Evidence can be
sufficiently separable so that the jury, properly instructed, would not consider it
together with any other charges. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 246-47
(2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); cf. Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S.
262, 268 (1898) (offenses retained their separate character to such an extent that error
or failure as to one had no essential influence on the other). The possibility always
remains, however, that the multiplicity of counts increased the jury's willingness to
convict defendants. United States v. Smith, 112 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1940) ('[E]vcn
when cautioned, juries are apt to regard with a more jaundiced eye a person charged
with two crimes than a person charged with one.").
34. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945); accord, Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 588 (1969) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 529).
35. United States v. Head, Nos. 79-5293, 79-5303, 80-6727, slip op. at 10 (4th
Cir. Feb. 9, 1981); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 898 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972).
36. In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court, following Strom-
berg, reversed a conspiracy conviction because it vas impossible to determine that
the jury had not convicted the defendants for conspiring to commit a substantive
crime that was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 311-12. The indictment in
this case charged defendants with conspiring "(1) to advocate and teach the duty and
necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and vio-
lence, and (2) to organize, as the Communist Party of the United States, a society of
persons who so advocate and teach, all with the intent of causing the overthrow of
the Government by force and violence." Id. at 300. The Court held that the statute
of limitations had run on the second objective, id. at 310-12, requiring withdrawal of
that charge from the jury's consideration. Id. at 312. The jury %%-as asked only for a
general verdict. Id. at 311-12 & n.17.
37. See note 12 supra.
38. In Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960), the Court ruled that if the
substantive count did not state a crime, the conspiracy count could not be sustained.
Id. at 393. Defendants were charged with mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail
fraud. Id. at 374-78. The Supreme Court held as a matter of law that defendants had
not used the mails for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud, and, there-
fore, the indictment did not charge a federal offense. Id. at 391. Circuit courts have
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for them to be guilty of criminal conspiracy.- If one of several objec-
tives does not state a crime,39 defendants are being charged with a
conspiracy to commit acts, only some of which are illegal."° In such
cases, a general verdict of guilty on the conspiracy count is of ques-
tionable validity because defendants may be convicted solely on the
basis of their agreement to achieve the lawful objective.
Common evidentiary and procedural characteristics of conspiracy
prosecutions cause this uncertainty. Because criminal agreements are
made in secret, they are difficult to prove by direct evidence."
recognized that a conspiracy conviction requires the allegation of a valid federal
offense. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Wilkinson, 601 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wedelstedt,
589 F.2d 339, 341-42 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United
States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669-70 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046-47 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Tarnopol, 561
F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388,
1401-02 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1290 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287,
297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d
184, 189-91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974); United States v. Clay, 495
F.2d 700, 710 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 (1974); United States v.
Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d
270, 283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. Haskell, 327
F.2d 281, 283-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964); Van Liew v. United
States, 321 F.2d 664, 670-72 (5th Cir. 1963); Samuel v. United States, 169 F.2d 787,
794-95 (9th Cir. 1948); Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir. 1943);
United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1940); Bailey v. United States,
5 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 269 U.S. 589 (1925); Kepl v. United
States, 299 F. 590, 591 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924). In contrast to a
legally impossible objective, a factually impossible objective is widely recognized not
to affect the validity of the conspiracy conviction. Thus, even if the group fails to
accomplish its objective through mistake or frustration, or the purpose is impossible
to achieve, the mere existence of an antisocial combination is a danger to society
because more complex or more difficult criminal acts are more likely to be under-
taken. Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir. 1927); Developments,
supra note 1, at 944-45. See generally 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 122 (1958). This logic
has been employed to rationalize conspiracy prosecutions that are brought against
dissident political and economic groups. See generally Arens, supra note 5; Filvaroff,
Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 189 (1972); Johnson, supra
note 1, at 1139; Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 Yale L.J. 872 (1970).
39. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
40. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957); Ventimiglia v. United
States, 242 F.2d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 1957); see note 15 supra.
41. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Goodson,
502 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Monticello, 264 F.2d 47, 49
(3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Morris, 225 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 901 (1955); Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1954);
Dodson v. United States, 215 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1954); Prichard v. United
States, 181 F.2d 326, 331 (6th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 168 F.2d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 613
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Therefore, circumstantial evidence of the agreement is permitted.4
Because this type of evidence is susceptible of more than one
interpretation,' however, it is difficult to determine which objective
the defendants sought to achieve. Moreover, the structure of the in-
dictment contributes to the confusion. A conspiracy charge is -almost
always brought in a single count," regardless of the number of objec-
tives alleged.' Guilt may be established by proof of an agreement to
(1949); Blumenthal v. United States, 158 F.2d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 1946), affd, 332
U.S. 539 (1947); Joyce v. United States, 153 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 860 (1946); Williams v. Cuyler, 491 F. Supp. 272, 275-76 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
United States v. Haskins, 40 F. Supp. 219, 221 (W.D. Mo. 1941); see Cousens,
supra note 1, at 910; Developments, supra note 1, at 933-35.
42. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975); Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974); United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1083
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990 (1979); United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355,
368 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); Developments, supra note 1,
at 933-35.
43. If the exact objective is uncertain, defendants may argue that the jury may
not have been in agreement as to which objective defendants conspired to commit.
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971). Defendants may also argue that the jury could have based the conviction
on an objective that did not state a crime. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
311-12 (1957); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 566 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 474-75 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Dansker,
537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v.
Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1973); McCutcheon v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 256,
261 (5th Cir. 1973); Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1963);
Samuel v. United States, 169 F.2d 787, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1948).
44. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919); United States v. DeLillo,
620 F.2d 939, 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 108 (1980); Rowvan v. United States
281 F. 137, 139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922); Anderson v. United
States, 269 F. 65, 76 (9th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 576 (1921); United States
v. Bloom, 78 F.R.D. 591, 601 (E.D. Pa. 1977). A single count may allege any crime
and that defendant committed it by one or more means. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); 8
J. Moore, supra note 5, $ 7.04, at 7-24; see United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453,
458 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 325 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666, 671 (2d
Cir. 1948).
45. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 587-88 (1961); Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 (1946); United States v. Head, Nos. 79-5293, 79-5303,
80-6727, slip op. at 4-5 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1981); United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d
239, 240-41 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Wilkinson, 601 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1031 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d
32, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Dansker, 537
F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v.
Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 289-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United
States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 569 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975); United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Goodwin, 455 F.2d 710, 711, 714 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972);
United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 895 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
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achieve any one of the objectives.4" The practical effect of charging
conspiracy in a single count is that the jury need not be unanimous as
to which objective the defendants agreed to commit."1 If, however,
the conspiracy were charged in several different counts, each alleging
one objective, the prosecutor would be required to convince all the
jurors regarding at least one of the objectives.4s
These problems are compounded by the use of general verdicts in
conspiracy cases.49 The prosecutor, therefore, need only convince
920 (1972); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 955 (1971); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 974 (1966).
46. United States v. Wilkinson, 601 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 325-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978); United
States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 387 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 528
F.2d 999, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); United States v. Frank,
520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States
v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United
States v. Crizaffli, 471 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973);
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1084-85 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971); McWhorter v. United States, 62 F.2d 829, 830 (5th Cir. 1933); Kepl v.
United States, 299 F. 590, 591 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924).
47. See United States v. Wilkinson, 601 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 387 (7th Cir. 1978,; United States v. Bolts, 558
F.2d 316, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978); United States v.
Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United
States v. Grizaffl, 471 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973).
In United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958
(1971), the defendant argued that, because the judge did not require a unanimous
jury to find that all the conspirators agreed on at least one unlawful object, "we
cannot know whether the jury unanimously agreed on whether a conspiracy to com-
mit a specific offense did in fact exist." Id. at 1084. The Ninth Circuit held that the
instruction that the jury must find a conspiracy to commit at least one of the offenses
unequivocally required unanimity. Id.
48. United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 570 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975).
49. 8A J. Moore, supra note 5, 31.02[3], at 31-6. There are exceptions, howev-
er. When one object of a conspiracy is a felony and another a misdemeanor, special
verdicts are proper. United States v. Haim, 218 F. Supp. 922, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
8A J. Moore, supra note 5, $ 31.02[3], at 31-8 to 31-9. Several circuits have implied
that there are other situations when special verdicts are proper. United States v.
Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1979) (when appellate court must
assess the sufficiency of the evidence or decide between statutory penalties), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir.
1976) (when an appellate court must determine when a defendant was a member of a
conspiracy for statute of limitations and sentencing purposes), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
907 (1977); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 1976) (when special
verdicts will serve a necessary purpose, as when the instruction of the court does not
adequately cover the issue); Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (1st Cir.
1974) (when it is necessary to determine the value of stolen property, whether the
death penalty should be imposed, and liability in bastardy proceedings), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 955 (1975).
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the jury that a single illegal agreement existed.' Consequently, it is
difficult to discover which objective the jury believed the defendants
agreed to achieve." Special verdicts,2 on the other hand, would
50. E.g., United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). But see United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d
566, 570 (1st Cir. 1974) (government can request special verdicts for practical
reasons, as when sentences for various objectives differ), ccrt. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975).
51. Model Penal Code § 5.03, Comment, at 122 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); see
note 1 supra and accompanying text.
52. The Constitution gives defendants the right to clear and unambiguous jury
verdicts. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Patterson v.
United States, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 221, 225 (1817); 8 J. \igmore, Evidence § 2350.
at 693 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961). Due process requires that all material issues
be found beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970);
United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Hatrak, 417 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.N.J. 1976), affd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978). Special verdicts, therefore, can be advan-
tageous to criminal defendants. In United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 3S5 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976), the court, with counsels' agreement,
allowed the jury to find defendants guilty or not guilty as to each objective sepa-
rately, with the result that defendants were found guilty as to one and not guilty as
to the other. Id. at 391-92. In Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952 (1962), "[tjhe jury was instructed that a guilty verdict
could be returned only if unanimous agreement were reached that Bisno concealed
at least one of the items of property mentioned in the indictment." Id. at 723. Under
this instruction, the jury could have disagreed as to which item wvas concealed and
still found defendant guilty. In United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 968 (1958), the court held that, although special interrogatories might "in-
fringe on [the jury's] power to deliberate free from legal fetters," id. at 276, there
were precedents for the procedure in common law jurisdictions, id. at 276-78, and
that the instant case required their application. Id. at 278-79. See also 8A J. Moore,
supra note 5, $ 31.02[3], at 31-7; 8 J. Wigmore, supra, at 693. Another reason why
special verdicts are advantageous for defendants is that they ameliorate the harshness
of collateral consequences of convictions. The parole commission rates the severity of
a conspiracy conviction according to the conduct forming the underlying offense if
such behavior is consummated. Paroling Policy Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at &S
(1980). In United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1980), defendants were
convicted of a conspiracy embracing two separate counterfeiting transactions, one
involving $1000 in currency and one involving over $900,000 in Armory Bonds. Id.
at 240-41. The Armory Bond counterfeiting charge was found not to state a crime
and was reversed, while the conspiracy conviction was upheld. The currency viola-
tion was considered to be of "Low Moderate" severity, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 83
(1980), whereas the lowest possible severity rating for the Bonds violation was "Very
High." Id. at 84. If the conduct can be classified under more than one category, the
most serious applicable category is to be used. Id. Therefore, Anzalone would have
been considered for parole under guidelines applying to the conviction that was over-
turned. See Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Bane at 10-12,
United States v. Anzalone, Nos. 79-1424, 79-1425 (2d Cir. Oct. 1. 19SO).
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lessen the chance of ambiguity.' Requiring the jury to determine
whether the defendants conspired to commit each objective is the
equivalent of charging conspiracy in separate counts, and would com-
pel the prosecution to prove each individual objective.- Special ver-
dicts and interrogatories, however, are disfavored in criminal
prosecutions-' because the judge's formulation of the questions O can
pressure juries to convict.Y
53. On the other hand, the defendant might prefer verdicts to be as ambiguous
as possible. Because the Constitution guarantees clear and unambiguous jury ver-
dicts, see note 52 supra, an appellate court must reverse a verdict if there is doubt as
as to its validity. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Mills v. United
States, 164 U.S. 644, 649 (1897); Government of V.I. v. Richards, 618 F.2d 242, 244
(3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. United
States, 230 F.2d 935, 938-39 (6th Cir. 1956); Frank v. United States, 220 F.2d 559,
565 (10th Cir. 1955); Samuel v. United States, 169 F.2d 787, 798 (9th Cir. 1948);
Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1934). Some courts have cited
Stromberg for the principle that an invalid jury instruction requires reversal of the
conviction, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949), even if the proper in-
struction was also given. Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622, 631 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962). The same rule should apply if the jury is permitted to
convict defendants for conspiring to achieve a goal that is not an offense,
54. United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 570 (st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975).
55. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385,
392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d
403, 412 (7th Cir. 1976), United States v. Bosch, 505 F.2d 78, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1974);
Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
952 (1962). But see note 49 supra and accompanying text. There is no provision in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for special verdicts or special interrogatories
in criminal trials except for trials before a judge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c). The only
possible basis for special verdicts is the provision allowing procedures not specifically
proscribed by rule when the procedures are lawful and not inconsistent with the
rules or any applicable statute. Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b). There is, however, no per se
rule that special verdicts are absolutely forbidden. United States v. O'Looney, 544
F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976). Special verdicts may be
requested when there is no danger that the jury will be pressured by the court to
reach a certain decision. Id. Special verdicts have been held proper under limited
circumstances. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. More complete findings in
all criminal cases serve the interests of judicial economy and those of prosecutors and
defendants. For example, the use of special findings might preserve convictions
when one of several theories submitted is subsequently rejected. See Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
368-69 (1931); Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622, 630-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 919 (1962); 8A J. Moore, supra note 5, 31.02[3], at 31-7.
56. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 183 (1st Cir. 1969); accord, Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
57. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1953); United States v. Honneus,
508 F.2d 566, 570 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S 948 (1975); United States v.
Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760, 765 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,
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The unavailability of special verdicts does not ordinarily pose a
problem on appeal of conspiracy convictions.M As long as there was
an overt act in furtherance of an agreement to accomplish an illegal
end, the defendants may be convicted of conspiracy.? When one of
several substantive counts fails to state a crime, however, there is
doubt as to whether there was an overt act in furtherance of an illegal
end.6w Because the possibility arises that defendants were convicted
for conspiracy to achieve what is not a crime, it becomes necessary to
determine which objective the jury believed defendants conspired to
commit.
II. MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE CONSPIRACY CASES
A. Automatic Retention of Convictions-Stromberg Ignored
Conspiracy convictions are often retained despite reversal of one of
the underlying crimes charged as an objective. 6' Without mentioning
Stromberg,' some courts hold that the invalid objective is unneces-
sary to support the conviction because other, valid objectives are
present? Regardless of the rationale, however, the possibility that
the jury may have based the conspiracy conviction solely on the in-
valid ground is not considered.?
Several courts have followed precedents that held that conspiracy
convictions are valid even if the government fails to prove the entire
180-83 (1st Cir. 1969); Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 276-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
58. Mogoll v. United States, 158 F.2d 792, 793 (5th Cir. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds, 333 U.S. 424 (1948); United States v. Albers, 115 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir.
1940); United States v. Klosterman, 147 F. Supp. 843, 846 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other
grounds, 248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1957).
59. See note 5 supra.
60. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
62. E.g., United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 394-95
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966); Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875,
878 (6th Cir. 1943); United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940).
63. United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975) ('Evidence of
accomplishment of one of the objectives of a conspiracy is enough to support the
conspiracy conviction." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976);
United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 139-40 (7th Cir.) ('However valid appellants'
claim is, [that one of the objectives alleged is not within federal jurisdiction], it does
not affect their convictions on the conspiracy count so long as any one of the objects
of the conspiracy is unchallenged."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
64. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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conspiracy as originally charged. These cases, however, actually
concerned situations in which the government charged a conspiracy
with certain characteristics and proved a conspiracy with different
characteristics. For example, when fewer conspirators were shown to
be involved, or were involved for a shorter time,6 the variation was
not fatal as long as what was proven was included within what was
charged.67 Thus, the rule developed that a charge of conspiracy to
commit several offenses against the United States may be upheld if
the government has proven a conspiracy to commit any one of the
objectives.68
This rule is sensible6 9 because a criminal conspiracy is an agree-
ment to commit an unlawful act.70 Consequently, proof of only one
objective is required. 7' When a conviction may have been based on
65. E.g., McWhorter v. United States, 62 F.2d 829, 830 (5th Cir. 1933);
Christiansen v. United States, 52 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 1931); Anstess v. United
States, 22 F.2d 594, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1927); Kepl v. United States, 299 F. 590, 591
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924); Remus v. United States, 291 F. 501,
505-06 (6th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 717 (1924).
66. United States v. Goodson, 502 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974); Christiansen
v. United States, 52 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 1931); Anstess v. United States, 22 F.2d
594, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1927); Kepl v. United States, 299 F. 590, 591 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924); Remus v. United States, 291 F. 501, 505 (6th Cir,
1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 717 (1924).
67. See Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir. 1943) ("Though proof
fails to show the full sweep of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, [if] what is
shown comes within its scope, there is no error in submission of it to the jury nor
infirmity in a verdict of guilty."); Ventimiglio v. United States, 61 F.2d 619, 620 (6th
Cir. 1932) (evidence failed to show defendant took part in conspiracy he was charged
with, though it showed his participation in a different conspiracy); Wyatt v. United
States, 23 F.2d 791, 792 (3d Cir. 1928) (proof of a different conspiracy from the one
charged is fatal), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 588 (1928). One variation in the proof that is
usually held fatal to a conviction is proof of more than one conspiracy when only one
was charged. In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the evidence
showed eight different conspiracies instead of the single conspiracy charged. Id. at
755. The Court held that the dangers of transference of guilt from one defendant to
another across the line separating the conspiracies were so great that no one could
say there was no prejudice to substantial rights. Id. at 774; see W. LaFave & A.
Scott, supra note 1, at 478 & n.110; cf. United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123,
131-32 (9th Cir. 1978) (court properly charged distinction between single and multi-
ple conspiracies).
68. See United States v. Birchfield, 486 F. Supp. 137, 139 (M.D. Tenn. 1980);
note 63 supra.
69. Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d 416, 422-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970). "[S]ince verdicts of juries must be viewed as the work of ordinary
intelligent and reasoning beings, judges will not presume that a jury would find guilt
upon an item not proved but that they would find guilt upon an item well proved."
Samuel v. United States, 169 F.2d 787, 796 (9th Cir. 1948).
70. United States v. Drawdy, 288 F. 567, 570 (S.D. Fla. 1923).
71. Bergen v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81-84 (1935); United States v. Kirby,
587 F.2d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Grizaffli, 471 F.2d 69,
73 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973); McWhorter v. United States,
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the act that is not criminal, however, application of the rule can re-
sult in injustice2 because the question whether there is sufficient
proof of an agreement to commit a valid objective is ignored. Thus,
citing authority that states a rule of sufficiency of evidence without
analyzing the evidence of an agreement to achieve a valid objective is
unfair to defendants in a conspiracy case in which one of the objec-
tives may not be an offense.
Retaining conspiracy convictions when one of the substantive
counts has been reversed has also been justified by characterizing the
invalidated objective as surplusage- 3  Surplusage, superficial or im-
material averments in an indictment that do not charge a crime, 4 is
not fatal to the conviction if the other material in the indictment is
sufficient to charge a crime."5 Because only one valid objective is
6 F.2d 829, 830 k5th Cir. 1933); Christiansen v. United States, 52 F.2d 950, 950-51
(5th Cir. 1931); Kepl v. United States, 299 F. 590, 591 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266
U.S. 617 (1924); United States v. Birchfield, 486 F. Supp. 137, 139 (M.D. Tenn.
1980).
72. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957).
73. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1178-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 979 (1979); United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496. 500-01 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Strauss, 283 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir.
1960); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1010-11 (D.N.J. 196s), rer'd on
other grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12,
25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1014 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); Christiansen v. United States, 52 F.2d 950, 951
(5th Cir. 1931).
74. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 602 (1927); United States v. Giese, 597
F.2d 1170, 1178-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v.
Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979);
United States v. Root, 366 F.2d 377, 379-81 (9th Cir. 1966), ccrt. denied, 386 U.S.
912 (1967); Bailey v. United States, 5 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 269
U.S. 589 (1925); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1010-11 (D.N.J. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. B. Coedde &
Co., 40 F. Supp. 523, 529 (E.D. Ili. 1941); United States v. Drawdy, 288 F. 567,
570 (S.D. Fla. 1923); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d); cf. United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1975) (court found indictment did not contain surplusage),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
75. United States v. Root, 366 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386, U.S. 912 (1967); United States v. Vazquez, 319 F.2d 381, 384-85 (3d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Strauss, 283 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1960); Sasser v. United States,
29 F.2d 76, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 836 (1929); United States v.
Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1010-11 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d
424 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Drawdy, 288 F. 567, 570 (S.D. Fla. 1923); cf.
United States v. B. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523, 529 (E.D. Ill. 1941) (surplus
averment may prejudice the defendant). Although "'convictions are no longer
reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which do not prejudice the
accused," Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962), when an indictment
contains legally insufficient language, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c), defendants may
challenge it as not charging an offense. A conviction upon an indictment, part of
which does not state a crime, would be unsupportable under the Stromberg rule, but
courts have characterized the language as surplusage and upheld the convictions.
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required to convict the defendant,6 some courts reason that the con-
spiracy conviction could be upheld even if one of the objectives was
invalid, The use of this rationale is questionable, however, in light
of Stromberg. Although the California District Court of Appeals had
considered the invalid clause in the statute superflous,'7 the Su-
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 602 (1927); Bailey v. United States, 5 F.2d 437,
438 (5th Cir.), cert. disinissed, 269 U.S. 589 (1925); United States v. Drawdy, 288 F.
567, 570 (S.D. Fla. 1923). Compare United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 48-49
(3d Cir. 1976) (person being bribed must agree to use his influence as a public
official or have the appearance of the ability to do so-, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977) with United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1010-11 (D.N.J. 1968) (mate-
rial in indictment as to status of person being bribed is surplusage), rev'd on other
grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971).
76. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1178-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 979 (1979); United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Strauss, 283 F.2d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir.
1960); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1010-11 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12,
25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
77. United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971), was a prosecution for using interstate com-
merce facilities to violate a New Jersey statute that prohibited the bribing of any
person to obtain any benefit from an office of the government. This statute has been
construed to reach only bribery of a public official or a person who gives the appear-
ance of possessing the ability to influence official conduct. United States v. Dansker,
537 F.2d 40, 48 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). Nevertheless, the
court in Zirpolo held that, although material describing recipients of the bribes as
public officials was not incorporated into the charges, this material was surplusage
because it could be deleted without impairing the government's case. 288 F. Supp.
at 1010-11. If the government could successfully prosecute the offense without prov-
ing those allegations, they might infringe on defendants' first amendment rights to
approach persons with no official status and pay them to lobby in the legislature.
United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d at 48-49; see United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d
1170, 1174-76 (9th Cir.) (in indictment for conspiracy to damage government proper-
ty, allegation of damage to private property incorporated into the conspiracy charge
by reference held superfluous and harmless), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979);
United States v. Strauss, 283 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1960) ("so long as the remain-
ing portions of the indictment adequately charge a crime, the presence of the sur-
plusage will not justify dismissal of the entire indictment"); United States v. Pope,
189 F. Supp. 12, 25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (the words "among other things" held sur-
plusage and stricken from indictment; words also dangerous because the government
could have used them to enlarge the substantive charges by a bill of particulars).
78. The analysis of language as surplusage is very similar to the excision the state
court in Stromberg performed on the California statute. People v. Mintz, 62 Cal.
App. 788, 794-97, 290 P. 93, 97-99 (1930) (Marks, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part), rev'd sub nom. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). That court
held that the words "of opposition to organized government" were superfluous and
did not add anything to the statute. Therefore, the statute could be treated as though
it did not contain those words. Id. at 797, 290 P. at 99 (Marks, J., concurring In
part, dissenting in part). The information closely followed the wording of the statute.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931). Therefore, the Court's character-
ization of language in the statute as superfluous was, in effect, a characterization of
the language in the indictment as surplusage, and unnecessary for the conviction.
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preme Court overturned the conviction because the jury could have
based its verdict on that clause.' It appears that, after Stromberg,
language in a statute or in an indictment that does not state a crime
could not be dismissed in an appellate proceeding as superflous with-
out an analysis of how it had been presented to the jury in the indict-
ment, information, argument, and instruction."
Thus, courts that have upheld multi-objective conspiracy
convictions8' have used faulty reasoning. Although the results in
these cases are not necessarily incorrect, this type of analysis is incon-
sistent with the Stromberg Court's concern about ambiguous general
verdicts based on valid and invalid counts.
B. Automatic Reversal of Convictions-
A Misapplication of Stromberg
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts summarily overturn
conspiracy convictions when a substantive count embodying an objec-
79. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
80. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
81. One commentator has indicated that courts respond to conspiracy prose-
cutions in an automatic way instead of carefully considering the policies involved.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1139-40 (the presence of a conspiracy charge in an indict-
ment automatically resolves certain issues); id. at 1144 (conspirators are liable for all
the crimes committed by any co-conspirators in furtherance of the common enter-
prise); id. at 1166-75 (joinder is proper); id. at 1175-80 (venue is proper in any dis-
trict in which an overt act was committed); id. at 1183-88 (out-of-court declarations of
co-conspirators are not hearsay). See also Sayre, supra note 1, at 405. Courts some-
times cite no authority to support the retention of the conspiracy conviction. See
United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972); Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir. 1943). Tanner has been
cited as authority in United States v. Kirby, 587 F.2d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1402 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Papada-
kis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v.
Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 190-91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974); and
United States v. Grizaffi, 471 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964
(1973). Other courts cite some cases that hold that proof of only one of the objectives
is required for a valid conspiracy conviction. United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290,
291 (2d Cir. 1940); see United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976). The James court cited two different types of cases: those
in which the objective has failed for lack of proof, United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d
1287, 1289-91 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); Christiansen v.
United States, 52 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 1931), as well as cases in which an objec-
tive has been invalidated for legal insufficiency instead of lack of proof. United States
v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); Hogan
v. United States, 48 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 668 (1931).
Courts also uphold the conspiracy conviction by characterizing the invalidity of the
substantive charge as failure of proof. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1393-
401 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Goodwin, 455 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972); United States v. Mfack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir.
1940).
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tive is reversed.12 In so doing, however, they apply Stromberg with-
out analyzing all the factors upon which the conspiracy conviction
could have been based.3 They believe that Stromberg and its prog-
eny require an appellate court, before sustaining the conspiracy,"l to
determine that the jury did not base the conspiracy conviction, in
whole or in part, on an impermissible ground.
This is an incorrect application of Stromberg. When the case is
applied in this manner, there is no distinction between the factual
situation in Stromberg and that of conspiracy cases involving several
substantive crimes that form the objectives of the conspiracy. In
Stromberg, the defendant was charged with one count of displaying a
red flag for any one of three illegal purposes.Y Because one of the
three purposes was unconstitutional, and there was no indication in
the trial record of which one the jury based its general verdict upon,
the Court viewed the conviction as incurably ambiguous. Strom-
berg, however, does not require reversal whenever a general verdict
might be based on an impermissible ground. Reversal is warranted
only "if it is impossible to ascertain whether the defendant has been
punished for noncriminal conduct." s
Substantive charges that function as the objectives of the conspi-
racy provide inferences by which an appellate court can determine
the objective that the jury believed the defendants conspired to
commit.' A general verdict on a conspiracy count charged in con-
82. E.g., United States v. Head, Nos. 79-5293, 79-5303, 80-6727, slip op. at 5-12
(4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1981); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 566-68
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United
States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 898 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 920
(1972); Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1963).
83. United States v. Head, Nos. 79-5293, 79-5303, 80-6727, slip op. at 10 (4th
Cir. Feb. 9, 1981); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894. 898 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972).
84. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
87. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 237 n.21 (1980) (citing United
States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978); Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931))
(emphasis added). In United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1980), the
court stated that "the first question is whether Anzalone and Rios would have been
convicted of a properly described conspiracy to violate the statute by counterfeiting
only currency. We note that Anzalone was convicted on four substantive counts in-
volving currency and that the evidence concerning Rios . . .involved only currency.
In our view the jury necessarily would have found Anzalone and Rios guilty of a
narrower, currency-related conspiracy." Id. at 246.
88. See United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 2,16 (2d Cir. 1980).
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junction with substantive crimes is not as opaque as a general verdict
on any other type of crime because many elements are common to
both the substantive crimes and conspiracy." Conviction on a valid
substantive charge indicates that the jury found all the elements
essential to a conviction on the conspiracy charge,' except the agree-
ment among the parties. Therefore, applying Stromberg to conspiracy
cases without analyzing inferences that can be drawn from a guilty
verdict on the substantive counts can result in invalidating a convic-
tion that could have been retained.
C. A Proposed Standard of Analysis
Considerations of judicial economy militate against overturning a
conviction if there is a clear and valid basis for sustaining it." An
appellate court should sustain a conspiracy conviction when one of
the objectives is invalid, if it can determine that the jury convicted
defendants of conspiracy to commit one of the remaining valid
objectivesY This determination can be made93 by engaging in a two
89. See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text.
90. The Supreme Court, in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), recognized
that when a defendant is charged with separate counts, tie jury must find guilt or
innocence as to each count. Id. at 588. Such verdicts provide positive evidence that
the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits. Id. When the other counts
embody the objectives of the conspiracy, the jury considers each of the objectives
separately and makes explicit findings as to each. These findings thus indicate some
of the jury's beliefs about each of the objectives.
91. In a criminal appeal, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show error in
the trial and that he was prejudiced. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 557-58
(1962); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1956); United
States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980
(1971); Hanna v. United States, 404 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 1015 (1969); Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 544 (9th Cir. 1966); Sica v.
United States, 325 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1963); Grady v. Iowa State Penitentiary,
346 F. Supp. 681, 683 (N.D. Iowa 1972). Similarly, when the issue is whether there
was sufficient evidence to support a verdict, the verdict will be upheld unless no
reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty. United States v. Clover, 514
F.2d 390, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); United States v. Cho Po
Sun, 409 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969); Figueroa v.
United States, 352 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1965); Rua v. United States, 321 F.2d
140, 143 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 (1964); People v. Gutierrez, 35
Cal. 2d 721, 727, 221 P.2d 22, 25-26 (1950) (en bane).
92. See notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text.
93. The function of an appeals judge is not to read the jury's mind, Beck v.
United States, 298 F.2d 622, 630 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962), and a
criminal sanction may not rest on what the appellate court thinks the jury would
have done had the issues been framed differently. United States v. Carman, 577
F.2d 556, 568 (9th Cir. 1978). Courts, however, have examined the record to decide
whether it is possible to determine the basis of a verdict. E.g., Street v. New York.
394 U.S. 576, 589-90 (1969) (court examined information and statites to determine
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step analysis. First, the court must find that the remaining substan-
tive crime can form the basis of a valid objective4 and constitute an
overt act. Second, evidence of the defendants' conduct must indi-
cate that it was impossible for the substantive crime validly charged
to have been committed except by an agreement."
The first step is necessary because it is the only way to know that
the jury believed the defendants intended to achieve the valid
objective.' In conspiracy cases in which there are also substantive
charges, verdicts on the underlying counts are equivalent to special
findings on several elements of a conspiracy conviction.' Because
most counts in an indictment are answered by a general verdict,O an
basis of verdict); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 & n.17 (1957) (not
clear that instruction required both objectives to be found, and the overt acts proven
concerned the invalid objective); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29, 540-41
(1945) (neither petition for contempt order nor contempt citation distinguished be-
tween valid and invalid bases); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 291-93
(1942) (clear that the state based its prosecution on a case the Court overruled);
United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1978) (court examined indict-
ment, evidence, and jury instruction to determine if mailings were in furtherance of
a scheme to defraud), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Baranski,
484 F.2d 556, 566-70 (7th Cir. 1973) (court examined difference between wording of
the conspiracy count and the substantive count); Williams v. Cuyler, 491 F. Supp.
272, 275-76 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (court examined evidence to determine if overt acts
showed a conspiracy to rob).
94. E.g., United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1402 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 289-90, 297 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 131 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076,
1078 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). When the objectives are not
charged as substantive counts, there is no independent way to ascertain what the
jury believed about any of the objectives. Consequently, if one of the objectives is
held invalid for any reason, and the verdict is general, the conspiracy charge must
fall. See United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 566-68 (7th Cir. 1973).
95. United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 897 n.3 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 920 (1972).
96. See United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Goodson, 502 F.2d 1303, 1305-06
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 897 n.3 (1st Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972). In United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974), for example, the court commented that because
the substantive violations were found to have existed, it was obvious that the defend-
ants had agreed to commit the crimes. Id. at 190 (comparing United States v.
Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 566-68 (7th Cir. 1973)).
97. See notes 5-11, 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
98. The lack of any indication of the basis for the jury's verdicts was the deciding
factor in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588 (1969), Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957), and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931).
99. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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acquittal will never indicate why the jury believed the defendants
were innocent."° If defendants were found guilty on the substantive
count, however, the jury must have found the intent to commit the
objective'' and an overt act."-
The agreement to commit the crime is the only element of con-
spiracy not proven by a substantive conviction. The second step in
the proposed analysis requires that there be some evidence indicating
that the agreement actually contemplated the commission of the valid
objective." 3 Because most agreements are made in secret, however,
the only proof as to which objective defendants conspired to commit
is the behavior of the defendants, °  which may indicate an agreement
to achieve the invalid objective, the valid objective, or both
objectives."'-
In the rare case when the defendants' acts demonstrate that they
conspired only to commit the invalid objective, the conspiracy convic-
tion must be reversed."6 For example, in a conspiracy case in which
the defendants are validly charged with advocating the violent over-
throw of the government and invalidly charged with organizing the
Communist Party, attendance at promotional meetings "unmarked by
any advocacy" constitutes an overt act in furtherance of the invalid
objective."'0 Retention of the conspiracy conviction under these cir-
100. The jury could have acquitted defendants of the substantive crime because
defendants had failed to accomplish the purpose, but could have convicted defend-
ants for conspiracy to accomplish the objective. See note 58 supra and accompanying
text.
101. Developments, supra note 1, at 936-37.
102. Id. at 946.
103. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 240-41, 246 (2d Cir. 1980) (a
defendant was convicted of conspiracy and the only evidence relating to him con-
cerned the valid counterfeiting charge); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339,
342, 345 (8th Cir. 1978) (defendant was convicted of valid substantive crime even
though he was not present at its commission), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979);
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1392-94 (2d Cir. 1976) (gravamen of prosecu-
tion was securities violations, which were well proven; invalid count charged that
defendant used mail to commit the securities violation); United States v. Driscoll,
449 F.2d 894, 895-96 (1st Cir. 1971) (defendant was convicted of attempt to smuggle
although he wasn't present at its commission), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972); ef.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 & n.17 (1957) (overt acts could not be
determined to have furthered the valid objective).
104. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Williams v. Cuyler, 491 F. Supp. 272, 275-76 (E.D. Pa.
1980). In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court reviewed the evi-
dence and found that the overt acts proved could not be determined to have fur-
thered the valid objective. Id. at 312 & n.17. This determination by the Supreme
Court supports analyzing the overt acts to determine which objective they furthered.
106. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957).
107. Id. at 311-12 & n.17.
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cumstances would defeat the underlying purposes of the Stromberg
rule.
When numerous defendants are convicted upon a valid substantive
count and upon a conspiracy charge alleging the substantive offense
as one of its objectives, an overt act, clearly in furtherance of the
valid objective,'08 indicates that the defendants were conspiring to-
ward that objective.' °  For example, in a conspiracy case in which
the defendants are validly charged with conspiring to pass counterfeit
currency and invalidly charged with conspiring to pass counterfeit
government bonds, a defendant's conversation with a potential pur-
chaser of the currency constitutes an overt act in furtherance of the
valid objective.' In such a situation, failure of any other substantive
count should not affect the conspiracy conviction."'
When the evidence indicates that the defendants conspired toward
both the valid and invalid objectives, two alternative situations can
arise. In the first situation, the valid substantive charge arises from a
transaction different from the one that forms the basis of the invalid
count."' In such cases, the jury would find the proof easily separ-
able, and their finding on the valid charge would be free from any
suspicion of prejudice caused by introduction of evidence relating to
the invalid charge."' In the second situation, the substantive charges
108. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 1980) (one defendant
convicted of conspiracy but the only evidence relating to him was in regard to the
valid substantive charge); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 244-45 (8th
Cir. 1978) (defendant convicted of substantive crime although he was not present at
its commission), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Driscoll, 449
F.2d 894, 897 n.3 (1st Cir. 1971) (court recognized that the conviction of defendant
for substantive count although he was not present at its commission could indicate
jury believed defendant was part of the conspiracy), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920
(1972).
109. In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court characterized the
overt acts as being in furtherance of only one of the objectives. Id. at 311-12 & n.17.
In Williams v. Cuyler, 491 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court examined the
relationship between the defendants and the circumstances surrounding the crime in
an attempt to determine if the overt acts showed a conspiracy to rob. Id. at 275-76.
110. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. Id.
112. E.g., id. at 241-42; United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Papadakis, 510
F.2d 287, 289-90, 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v.
Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); Christiansen
v. United States, 52 F.2d 950, 950 (5th Cir. 1931).
113. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1980) (evidence of
Armory Bond counterfeiting tainted neither currency conviction nor conviction for
conspiracy to counterfeit currency); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 342
(8th Cir. 1978) (evidence of two thefts separate and distinct; valid objective formed
sufficient basis for the conspiracy allegations), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979);
United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1978) (evidence relating to credit
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may be so closely -intertwined that if the jury found all the elements
of the invalid count, it would necessarily have found all the elements
of the valid count."4  In these cases, even if the jury had convicted
defendants of conspiracy to commit the invalid objective, it would
necessarily have found a conspiracy to commit the valid objective.""
Thus, the conspiracy conviction would be sustained.
Under this analysis, many of the cases that uphold conspiracy con-
victions, although one of the objectives does not state a crime, " fol-
low the wrong reasoning but reach the proper result."- In most
collection by extortion distinct from evidence relating to mail fraud), cert. denied.
440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 289-90, 297 (2d Cir.)
(narcotics offenses and obstructing communication of information to federal officer.
court does not point out that this evidence is separable but instead admits it because
it is relevant on the charge of obstructing justice), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975),
United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 142 (7th Cir.) (transporting explosives in
interstate commerce easily separable from evidence relating to exploding ship), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
114. E.g., United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (2d Cir. 1976) (if the
jury convicted for conspiracy to commit mail fraud, it would have found every ele-
ment necessary for a violation of securities laws because defendant violated securities
laws through use of mail); United States v. Goodwvin, 455 F.2d 710, 714 (10th Cir.)
(intent that counterfeit money pass as genuine, would arguably include intent to
defraud, which is sufficient to convict on the valid charge), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
859 (1972); United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940) (if the jury
convicted defendant for conspiracy to harbor and conceal an illegal alien, they would
have convicted for failure to register the alien); Bailey v. United States, 5 F.2d 437,
437-38 (5th Cir.) (if defendant was convicted for conspiracy to sell liquor at wholesale
without paying the tax, then he also conspired to sell liquor at wholesale in violation
of the eighteenth amendment), cert. dismissed, 269 U.S. 589 (1925). In United States
v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972), the court
commented that in finding defendant guilty of an attempt to smuggle illegal aliens,
the jury must have found him guilty of a conspiracy to smuggle because he clearly
was not present when the attempt was made. Id. at 897 n.3. This analysis of the
elements of the crime has precedent in other circuit court decisions. See United
States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d
270, 283-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
115. See note 114 supra.
116. E.g., United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 421
U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966); Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir.
1943); United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940).
117. In United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit
overturned a mail fraud conviction because defendants' plan did not constitute a
scheme to defraud. Id. at 1401. The court could properly have upheld the conspiracy
conviction because, even had the jury convicted defendants of conspiracy to commit
mail fraud, defendants' conduct could only have been mail fraud because they used
the mail to consummate the securities fraud. See note 114 supra and accompanying
text. The court, however, upheld the conspiracy conviction solely because defendant
was convicted of the valid objective. 536 F.2d at 1401-02. Similarly, in United States
19811
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
cases, there will be evidence of overt acts directed to the accomplish-
ment of a valid objective."8 There is no reason for the conspiracy
conviction to be overturned, as in cases that follow Stromberg
strictly,"9 when it can logically be determined that the jury believed
the defendants conspired to commit one of the other crimes with
which they are charged. 20 The analysis proposed in this Note per-
mits retention of these conspiracy convictions by appellate courts
while protecting defendants from ambiguous general verdicts based
on invalid counts.
Clare Sherwood
v. Goodwin, 455 F.2d 710 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972), the Tenth
Circuit overturned a conviction for violation of a statute prohibiting transfer of coun-
terfeit currency with intent that it pass as genuine because defendants had no plan
that the currency would pass as genuine. Id. at 713-14. The court could properly
have upheld the conspiracy conviction because, even had the jury convicted defend-
ants of conspiracy to transfer counterfeit currency with intent that it pass as genuine,
they would arguably have found an intent to defraud, all that is necessary to convict
for a conspiracy to achieve the crime with which defendants were validly charged.
See note 114 supra and accompanying text. The court, however, upheld the con-
spiracy conviction solely because defendants had been convicted of a valid substan-
tive crime.
118. United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 1980) (telephone con-
versation relating to currency only); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339,
344-45 (8th Cir. 1978) (telephone conversation that defendants would attempt theft
again), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388,
1394 (2d Cir. 1976) (proxy statement and 10-K report filed without required indebt-
edness information); United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir.) (transfer
of heroin to possession of one of the defendants after agreement to keep it), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 187, 190 (7th
Cir.) (agreement obvious from mutilated records); cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974);
United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir.) (transporting explosives In
furtherance of valid bombing charge), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
119. United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 566 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d
466, 476 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894, 897 n.3
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972).
120. When it is possible to determine the basis of a jury verdict, the existence of
an invalid basis will not cause the conviction to fail. See notes 108-09 supra.
